Proposal: Upload DexArbRouter v1.0.0 (Private, OnlyAddress)

Proposal Discussion
1

[Pre‑Chain Discussion] Proposal: Upload DexArbRouter v1.0.0

Author: Sergey Tarasenko sergeitarasenka@gmail.com

Deposit: 20 OSMO

Proposal Type: CosmWasm Code Upload

Instantiate Permission: OnlyAddress → osmo1wjgnr07fxuvfc4sd8vpc8x82wmj8qyhw0uergt

Summary

This proposal seeks to upload the CosmWasm contract DexArbRouter v1.0.0 to the Osmosis mainnet. The contract is intended for internal DEX arbitrage operations, specifically executing multi‑hop swaps across available liquidity pools. It is not audited, but has been fully validated on testnet, including all functional flows and migration.

Details

  • Contract Name: DexArbRouter v1.0.0

  • SHA256 (osmosis.wasm): d15e2aada957535fca45e163f2c0c41fcce68cc50a3aa5754652ae858859f105

  • Privacy: Private CosmWasm contract — restricted instantiation (OnlyAddress).

  • Purpose:

    • Execute multi‑hop swaps for internal arbitrage strategies.

    • Operate under strict access control to prevent unauthorized use.

    • Support whitelist‑based execution: the admin can add addresses to a whitelist, and only those addresses are permitted to perform multi‑hop swaps via the contract.

  • Access Control: Only the specified address above can instantiate this contract.

Testing and Validation

  • Environment: Tested extensively on Osmosis testnet.

  • Coverage: Multi‑hop routing, fee handling, slippage checks, failure cases (e.g., insufficient liquidity, invalid routes).

  • Migration: Store → instantiate → migrate → execute validated end‑to‑end.

  • Status: Not audited; testnet verification completed.

  • Testnet activity: All test deployments and migrations can be reviewed on Mintscan Osmosis Testnet.

Rationale

  • Operational Security: Proprietary routing logic and whitelist execution prevent misuse.

  • Network Efficiency: Optimized multi‑hop execution can improve liquidity utilization in targeted operations.

  • Transparency: Binary hash provided for verification; governance can review scope before upload.

Governance Considerations

  • This proposal only uploads code; it does not instantiate the contract.

  • Instantiation is restricted to the whitelisted address.

  • Execution of swaps is further restricted to addresses explicitly added to the contract’s whitelist by the admin.