So Pool #1062 USDC:IST has ~$10.2k in liquidity, which is ~1/5th of Pool #906 CMST:DAI:IST , but has ~47.4% greater 7 day volume than Pool #906.
While Pool $939 USDC:USDT has 80% ($8.2K) more liquidity than Pool #1062, and a 7 day volume that is 85% ($29.2K) greater, when normalized on a per a per dollar of liquidity basis, Pool #1062 has almost the same 7 day volume as Pool #939 USDC:USDT.
Pool #939 USDC:USDT
For every dollar of liquidity, there was $3.45 in volume the past 7 days.
($63,400/$18,400 = $3.45)
Pool #1062 USDC:IST
For every dollar of liquidity, there was $3.35 in volume the past 7 days.
($34,200/$10,200 = $3.35)
(A 3% difference. 3.45-3.35-0.1. 0.1/3.35= 0.02985)
Furthermore, based on the current Regular Incentive Adjustment Spreadsheet, adding Pool #1062 seems like there would still be fewer OSMO incentives spent on stable-stable category pools in total than what is being spent on the Pool #938 USDC:avaxUSDC:polyUSDC, which would support ~3x more liquidity and generate more in fees too. (This doesn’t take into account Hathor’s Nodes optimization though.)
From the current Regular Incentives Adjustment Spreadsheet:
Pool # - Liquidity - Spread Factor - Daily OSMO Spend
Pool #908 CMST:DAI:IST - $52.9K Liquidity - $0 - 1.44 OSMO Daily
Pool #939 USDC:USDT - $10.8K Liquidity - $1 - 3.87 OSMO Daily
Total = $63.7K Liqudity - $1 - 5.31 OSMO Daily
Pool #938 USDC:avaxUSDC:polyUSDC - $20.8K Liquidity -$0 - 12.10 OSMO Daily
Just thought I would put it out there.
We should onboard IST/USDT as part of a bumper creation gov prop for supercharged pools and then look to incentivize that as part of a rethink of how incentives are split between pairs.
IST/USDC when the native gets here; until then, I’m in favor of building USDT usage as a native stable.
Incentivizing a native USDT:IST pool makes a lot of sense.
And for the amount of incentives that the current USDC:IST pool would receive, it seems like if native USDC is truly imminent, incentives can wait till there is a native USDC:IST pool.
Osmosis does seem over dependent on USDC, and greater USDT liquidity would help manage risks better as there is a historic inverse relationship between USDT and USDC stability. USDT is historically the more ‘unstable’ stablecoin though.
On an unrelated note, I do wonder how aggressive PayPal and Paxos will be in expanding native availability for PYUSD and how much of a ‘threat’ it is to Tether-USDT’s dominance. PayPal-Paxos-PYUSD seems to have the benefit of learning from Binance-Paxos-BUSD ‘failures’ and MoneyGram-Stellar Lumen-USDC and Mitsubishi-Toki-TBD Yen Stablecoin ‘successes’.
USDT is also already existing longer than USDC right? And has seen its fair share of attacks on the coin as well, which might lead to the history of “unstability”.
I am very much looking forwards to the “battle” which will commence between the major stables and how the landscape will look like in let’s say 1-2 years from now.
@JohnnyWyles in the new model from Hathor we will still need to vote which assets are included in the incentives program, right? Or will we be able to get to some algorythm which recognizes the pools which pass a certain test / threshold and are therefore eligible? That would certainly avoid the kind of posts @RedRabbit33 made, since a pool which is performing really well would automatically be included instead of having to wait until someone notices it, puts up a discussion, puts it to governance, etc.
With Hathor’s we still vote on pool entry.
Aiming to bring a prop to chain in the next month or so to move towards voting pairs entry, including more generic “pairs” such as IST/STABLE.
Although, I always found it curious that we never explicitly voted to require proposals to add pools to the incentive system. It just became the social norm after some initial failures of the routine weekly proposal.
(Also, RIP weekly incentive proposal now the Hathor prop passed)
Longer term, a combination of Hathor’s model and a form of bribe system could totally replace the external incentive structure by codifying acceptable spend targets and levels. This is still very much in the ideation stage.
Check, and then IST/USDC, IST/USDT, etc would all be eligible for incentives because they match the IST/STABLE requirement, right?
@LeonoorsCryptoman - That is probably true, but I was speaking more to the empirical research on stablecoin stability that have compared the (in)stability of the two stablecoins during specific timeframes which they were both in circulation, like during COVID. (e.g https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4398546 and Analysis of Stablecoins during the Global COVID-19 Pandemic | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore).
@JohnnyWyles -Is the spreadsheet still something that can be produced though? Or should bother @HathorNodes to make the data from the dashboard exportable?
It will be maintained for the foreseeable future since we’ll likely be using the same generation mechanism to load the new values. I’m working with Hathor next week to plug the data from the dashboard in automatically
The spreadsheet is rapidly becoming obsolete anyway with Supercharged pools since the APR is not position specific.
I actually rarely look at the APR data in the spreadsheet. The main data points I am interested in are: liquidity; spread factor; daily OSMO spend; daily dollar value of OSMO spend; daily dollar value of external incentives.
The dashboards are exportable into CSV. If you have other datapoints you’d like to see, let us know and we’ll see what we can do! Don’t want to clutter the dashboards or end up w/ too many dashboards, but we definitely want important information to accessible to the community in general.