Phase out Incentives on Low Revenue Pools Part 2

Original Thread: Commonwealth

  • By voting YES on this proposal, OSMO stakers voice their support for a staged removal of OSMO incentives from the listed pools.

  • By voting NO on this proposal, OSMO stakers voice their dissent to a staged removal of OSMO incentives from the listed pools.

Following the discussion on proposal #376, based on this commonwealth post here. We are proposing to remove incentives from the following pools based on their low volume and generated fees. The following 9 pools are the lowest in fees generated, generating less than $10 in fees per day. Omitted are pools that have external incentives like NCT and BTSG.

608 OSMO LUM

577 OSMO XKI

602 OSMO CHEQ

900 OSMO FTM

648 OSMO PSTAKE

651 OSMO SWTH

42 OSMO REGEN

626 OSMO BAND

731 OSMO LINK

(Total emissions 0.15%)

This proposal would also remove the minimum incentives on the following pools:

CRO (9), currently 2%

DAI (674), currently 3.5%, for the same reasons - DAI isn’t used anywhere.

DOT (773), currently 0.5%, came in before the bootstrapping expiry was a standard.

Schedule

Incentives on the following pools will be removed over two weeks at regular incentive proposals as follows:

Week 1 - 50%

Week 2 - 0%

For consideration in another proposal

If deemed appropriate we could also include in another proposal the pools for BNB, AVAX, DOT, MATIC and ARB in this same proposal. As shown by playwo in this thread:

these pools don’t bring any outside volume to Osmosis and could be incentivized in specific liquidity attraction programs.

Target on-chain: May 6th 2023

Written by luisqa from Interbloc.

1 Like

thought:

If they’re so tiny, why bother unless the chain is looking dead?

I was wondering the same ^^

The automatic incentive updates already take care of making the incentives tiny (the system works in that perspective). I rather push to finally see more of the Hathor Nodes analysis where we paid dearly for, because that would solve this situation completely.

1 Like


Leonoor’s Cryptoman
osmo14amd

•

6/6/2023

Stupid question maybe; but instead of doing this on a case-by-case basis and having discussions if projects should be included or excluded…

Should it not be wiser to define a bottom threshold in terms of collected fees vs OSMO spend for a project to receive OSMO incentives which is included in the weekly incentive program?

1 Like

luisqa | Interbloc
osmo1mc8x

•

6/5/2023

Updated to add the removal of incentive minimums.

@RedRabbit33 not sold on the Regen pool argument to be honest. In the end we are also removing incentives from the pools you mentioned, they don’t contribute enough.


Johnny Wyles
osmo1

•

6/5/2023

Could you define what the staged removal is too btw?

Assuming 50% reduction of incentives at next routine and then total removal at the following one?

luisqa | Interbloc
osmo1mc8x

•

6/5/2023

Yeah, my bad. Same procedure as last time. Will add it in.


Johnny Wyles
osmo1

•

6/1/2023

Talked briefly on Telegram but bringing my suggestions here.

I agree with Playwo’s conclusion, but disagree with him on what we should do about it.

There are no uses for these assets but LPing in the Cosmos because the liquidity is not deep enough to add them to Mars and the arbitrage trading alone is not sufficient enough to sustain functional liquidity without being subsidized by incentives and/or SFS.

I believe we should be incentivising more appropriately and using incentives actively to bootstrap these pools significantly once there is a use for the assets that will start generating additional trading revenue. Until then we should have them listed and small amounts of liquidity for users to be able to buy and sell any asset they want on Osmosis.

Because of that, incentives beyond swap fees, compensating for OSMO inflation and encouraging external spends should be deliberate. Since Superfluid compensates for OSMO inflation we should be using that more rather than LP incentives.

We should also move to a different incentive metric overall, either Hathor’s and/or one that targets what users actually want rather than something that is inherent in the liquidity presence for pools that we have here. I’ll be proposing something along those lines in the next few weeks.

For now, I’ll add to the above:

Abolish Minimums on

  • CRO (9), currently 2%
  • DAI (674), currently 3.5%, for the same reasons - DAI isn’t used anywhere.
  • DOT (773), currently 0.5%, came in before the bootstrapping expiry was a standard.

ARB will end in 2 weeks anyway, at which point we could shift it to Superfluid perhaps?


Leonoor’s Cryptoman
osmo14amd

•

6/4/2023

Yeah, getting rid of the minimums is a must-have. Are there other pools who still have that benefit? I would go for all of them, just to avoid we have to do case-by-case patching in the future.

Furthermore; @luisqa | Interbloc I am more interested in the outcome of Hathor’s analysis, especially if the impact is a mere 0.16% of total daily emissions. There is not much to gain here in that case. So I wouldn’t mind if this waited for a bit longer, because I think we should refrain from changing too much parameters at once (or shortly after each other) which makes it hard to evaluate the effect of a change.

1 Like


Johnny Wyles
osmo1

•

6/4/2023

It would leave ETH and WBTC with minimums - which I would be very opposed to removing.

Maximums are in place on ATOM and USDC too or else they would dominate their respective categories even more than they already do. Once large liquidity is in place it is very hard for a pool to generate volume to outcompete those.


d0bby
osmo14uj5

•

6/5/2023

Agreed. After listening to Sunny’s comments at the Gateway Conference, it seems like we should probably keep the WBTC minimums in place.


RedRabbit33
osmo1hxfd

•

5/31/2023

If anything, I believe REGEN deserves to be saved from the chopping block. I believe that the amount of incentives the REGEN/OSMO pool receives is worth the investment, particularly due to the growing carbon market, but also as part of Osmosis’s commitment to being a carbon neutral chain & part of Cosmos Zero, because the NCT/OSMO pool is being incentivized by REGEN, and also because of protocol owned liquidity via the REGEN/NCT pool. Furthermore, overall token volume, in dollar terms, since December, has remained consistent, despite an ~50% drop in token value.

Because incentives are fee weighted, it seems that the REGEN/OSMO pool could realistically generate more than $10 a day in fees on a consistent basis, and therefore not be on the chopping block (if that is the criteria being used), if it increased its swap fee from 0.20% to 0.30%, or even 0.50%. CHEQ may also be able to get away with such a trick as well.

Reworking incentives is important. BUT…personally, I think it would be much more efficient and effective in the long run if the multi-hop discount wasn’t tied to incentives and instead was a separate benefit that governance could provide, as the value of the multi-hop discount is just as valuable, if not more, to current low-volume pools (particularly ones that are still active projects and still have a rather significant amount of liquidity - eg. $100K or more in liquidity.)

UPDATE: The DOT/OSMO and AVAX/OSMO pools received ~6.65x more OSMO incentives than the REGEN/OSMO pool (~113 OSMO per day vs ~17 OSMO per day), yet collected only ~2x amount in fees (~$12 vs $6) (DOT & AVAX pools collected $0.106 in fees per OSMO per day vs REGEN = $0.353 in fees per OSMO per day; REGEN gets ~3.3x more in fees, in dollar terms, for every OSMO that was spent).

The ARB/OSMO pool did slightly better than the AVAX and DOT pools, but still fell short of the REGEN pool. The ARB pool received ~113 OSMO per day in incentives and collected $17 in fees per day. That equates to $0.15 in fees per OSMO per day, which is ~42% better than the DOT and AVAX pools but still ~57% less than what the REGEN/OSMO pool did. l would venture to guess that FIL and LINK are among the worse performs in terms of fees collected for the OSMO that is spent because they never received bootstrapping incentives like DOT, AVAX, ARB, and FTM. If they had, or if they do, I don’t expect them to perform any better though, given the $1.60 it costs to bridge these tokens over.

The REGEN/OSMO pool actually collected roughly the same amount in fees this past 7 days, in dollar terms, on a per OSMO per day basis, as the HUAHUA/OSMO pool; the HUAHUA/OSMO pool received ~43 OSMO per day and collected $17 in fees (or $0.395 in fees per OSMO per day), while the REGEN/OSMO pool received ~18 OSMO per day and collected $6 in fees ($0.333 in fees per OSMO per day). I would estimate that at least 50% of the $0.06 difference(~19%) can be explained (in a statistically significant way if an analysis was run) by three factors: 1) HUAHUA’s marginally higher staking rewards (29.9% vs 22.5%: a 7.4 percentage point difference); 2) REGENs slightly higher inflation (17.3% vs. 15.3%: a 2 percentage point difference); and 3) relayer fees to deposit REGEN (0.00315 REGEN x $0.075 = $0.00023625) currently costing ~25.6x more than HUAHUAs (0.21 x $0.0000440 = $0.00000924) in dollar terms and network tx fees. (Personally, I believe the passage of HUAHA Prop #48, and its implementation of a 100 HUAHUA tx fee will do more harm than good, but we will have to wait and see). The HUAHUA validator on Osmosis 5% commission (assuming that its operated by the HUAHUA chain ) could also explain some of this difference, assuming that the OSMO is being traded or used to subsidize the relay costs. (Perhaps REGEN - and other chains too - would benefit from operating their own validators and getting into the active set on Osmosis like HUAHUA, STARS, XKI do)


Leonoor’s Cryptoman
osmo14amd

•

5/31/2023

Also here, what is the progress on the analysis done by Hathor Nodes?

This is designed to solve these kind of questions, but it is awefully quiet on that field… and that doesn’t give me a pleasant feeling.


ZKValidator_Hector
osmo1ttwm

•

5/31/2023

Hey Luis,

Thanks for putting this proposal together.

We completely agree on phasing out incentives on these pools that are not generating any revenue!

1 Like

luisqa | Interbloc
osmo1mc8x

•

5/30/2023

Furthermore, we seem to be overincentivizing CRO liquidity, propose we either remove it or adjust it significantly: