There are also a couple of CEX-run validator nodes already. Using this to increase their stake would undermine the purpose of a market-making proposal since it then wouldn’t be liquid and able to fulfill its purpose. Therefore this wouldn’t increase CEX validator’s stake directly.
I’m generally in favour of this since we keep seeing huge price discrepancies across exchanges, especially when deposits are closed for some reason.
Also not a fan of the information not being public, but this does seem to be very much a standard when it comes to dealing with Market Makers so can’t be helped.
There is no direct relation between this proposal and CEXs running validators. MMs would not be able to stake the OSMO they use for market making, nor could any CEX use the OSMO for that purpose without the account holders’ permission.
Hey everyone! A bit of an update on this proposal. Due to an issue related to the SDK 47 migration, these proposals were submitted incorrectly and have failed to execute despite passing governance.
Osmosis grants will be resubmitting both 706 and 707 shortly, and would ask that voters please vote again. Sorry for the inconvenience here. We appreciate everyone who came out to vote on the proposals thus far.
@RealVovochka in essence, Osmosis recently migrated to a newer version of the Cosmos SDK, which made some significant changes to the governance module. Proposal submission UIs had not yet updated to reflect those changes, so a few proposals that were submitted shortly after the upgrade and submitted from those UIs were incorrectly formatted, resulting in the proposals failing to execute.
Imagine we are dumb. Please eli5 (and for those who don’t understand mming) what are the benefits/costs for osmo stakeholders not knowing key conditions of market-making agreement between osmo and MM. So far I can understand why MMs want it, because this way they can hide from their competitors their fees etc, but I don’t understand what the point of secrecy for the osmo stakes to tell publicly the amount of fees for the market-making, market-makers liabilities, making sure that mm won’t abuse the funds for mm etc. Please do not use reference that everyone does it, tell the reasons why it’s done this way.
I don’t think whales are this stupid and have fat fingers. What about glitches in the CENTRALIZED exchange?
Also, how can we monitor the performance of the market makers, since their orders are not public (when on a CEX)?
And lastly, how much is the commission!?
I see the proposal just went on-chain without this crucial info given to us!
Big red flag for me, voting NO.
Edit: from what we know the “market makers” could dump all the OSMO to buy it back later (lower) and even get paid for their “service”!
Who are they? We need to know for sure.
Please don’t allow another shady collapse like LUNA guys…
Since I’m being tagged about this on Twitter, I thought I’d clarify, my contributions to this conversation are as a community member who works in the industry.
I am not in any way linked to this prop. I am not going to be one of the MMs lmao. And I’m not even part of the committee that will select the MMs.
I read this prop for the first time on the forums, just like everyone else.
A market maker bot trades faster and more efficiently than any person ever could. Is this some industry secret? I shared this info in discord a long time ago when the discussion was about designing an api in osmosis that could be equivalent to a central exchange.
We should not support any actions that have potential to fragment the liquidity of osmosis in longer term because ultimately liquidity matters the most. Osmosis as the only liquid hub will force new users to try it which will result in onboarding of new users although some people may not come but overall its a net positive. In the meantime, use the funds to make osmosis user experience positive in order to retain most new users next bull market.
Please tell us explicitly about these vulnerabilities.
I am not really interested in who is mm (as long as it is not DWF;)), but why we are not given explicit agreement conditions like how much is going to mming out of 7mln and how stewards would insure that mmers don’t abuse the funds.
Also an aside question we weren’t given any clarification on why exactly 7 mln, not 3 or 5.
I don’t mind not knowing who the market makers are, but I really would like to see a document with requirements against which the MMs are being chosen / assessed.
That is now missing, which means we are giving a blanq cheque of over 10 million dollar. And that part I don’t like. With clear boundaries where we know what we are getting (but not knowing who delivers) I would be more leaning to Yes. Now it is a clear No.
Personally, I’ve used this bot before…I don’t know what the goals are with the market maker proposal. If it’s to provide linear stability to the price action of osmo - then the bot is perfect for that. If it’s to maximize the gains made trading those tokens - the bot can do that to, but the parameters need to be evaluated and adjusted with market conditions to maximize gains.
I personally think this proposal should stipulate the use of the bot, it doesn’t matter if anyone knows who a market maker is - the only thing that matters is orders on an order book for whatever cex the orders will be placed on.
Noone would want to do that all day every day manually. That could get very stressful and boring.
The bot can be fine tuned to achieve whatever objective the proposal is trying to achieve. What is the goal of the token request?
We are now 3 months passed this governance proposal. Is there time for an update?
I see a lot of this coming by on X / Twitter and I think it is good for the community to know what happened with this massive spend and whether it is doing what it is supposed to do.
